Abstract-With the development of the smart grid and the advancement in the renewable energy technology, integration of Distributed Energy Resources (DER) has significantly increased in the electric power grid. One of the predominant renewable energy sources, wind energy, possess a significant challenge for grid operations, due to its intermittency and variability. In some operating conditions, part of wind has to be curtailed for the safe utilization of the transmission system. In order to minimize the wind power curtailment and to keep the power flow on a transmission line under limits, a cyber resilient Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) is developed in this paper. The RAS is formulated as an optimization problem, considering the real power flow constraints of the transmission lines and voltage constraints of the transmission buses. RAS is developed to operate even under limited failures in the computing nodes to make it cyber-resilient RAS. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is validated through offline simulations of the New England 39 bus system and online simulations of IEEE 14 bus test system. A cyber-physical test bed utilizing Real Time Digital Simulator (RTDS), Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), and a communication emulator (NS-3) has been used for the online simulation and validation of the developed cyber-resilient RAS.
I. INTRODUCTION
Based on the Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21) Global Status Report [1] , renewable energy generates almost 23.7% of global electricity. Wind energy consumption is 19% of the total renewable energy consumption in 2015 and this percentage is expected to increase [2] . However, the wind generation highly depends on local weather conditions. The intermittent and uncertain nature of power generation from wind farm may cause frequent violations of the ampacity ratings of the low voltage transmission lines. Curtailing some of the wind generation can avoid overload in the system.
Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) provides automatic control action with high impact on the system performance. The input data to a response based RAS must be processed to remove sensor noise; and identify a possible malicious attack, if cybersecurity is a concern. Typical time bounds for different RAS operations are several seconds for thermal overload, a few hundred milliseconds for voltage instability and a few tens of milliseconds for transient instability problems in exterme scenarios. The RAS under consideration is related to thermal overload problems which requires the time bound to be in the range of several seconds.
There has been a renewed interests among both system operators and wind power producers on wind curtailment as a solution to the transmission overload problems caused by the increased wind penetration. Curtailment is a reduction in the output of a generator from what it could otherwise produce given available resources, typically on an involuntary basis [3] . Owing to technical and economic constraints [4] , excessive portions of the wind generation are curtailed and hence wasted [3] . Curtailment of wind can lead to many undesirable consequences. Primarily, it results in useful energy being wasted. Secondly, revenue of the wind industry can be reduced significantly, which puts wind projects at risk of not meeting their debt obligations or reducing the amount of debt that the project's cash flows can support. Hence, there is a need to minimize wind curtailment such that line limits are not violated.
In many cases, curtailments are implemented manually whereby grid operators call wind facilities to issue curtailment directives. Manual curtailment instructions are used by Salt River Project, Tucson Electric, New England Independent System Operator (NE-ISO), PacifiCorp, and Mid Continent Independent System Operator (MISO) [5] . PacifiCorp's generation center can manually control wind output levels for wind facilities they own.
Majority of the utilities, including the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) have realized the importance of the optimal and automatic curtailment. Manual curtailment processes for wind has generally extended curtailment periods due to the time required to implement curtailment and reluctance to release units from curtailment orders. Automatic communication procedures can speed the implementation of curtailment orders and reduce overall curtailment time. Moreover, automated wind curtailments can also relieve the system stress faster, thereby ensuring better reliability of the power supply.
Recently, more and more information and communication technologies have been deployed in the power system for maintaining the reliability of power grid and increasing the integration of renewable energy. Remedial Action Scheme (RAS), which is designed for detecting the abnormal system conditions and maintaining the system stability, has been widely used in the power system operation and control [6] .
There are several RAS, which have already been implemented in industry [7] - [12] .
Based on the literature survey, the following are key issues identified in the existing automated RAS approaches:
• Most of the existing approaches are not resilient to any faults in the computing node or in communication architecture. The curtailment decisions are taken at a single control node. Failure of the central node may prove catastrophic to the system operations.
• Most of the RAS that exist today are hard coded and does not provide any flexibility for frequent changing operating conditions. RAS developed for one operating condition may not be suitable when the systems conditions change. Operating conditions in a power system change abruptly. Hence, a response based RAS, which is adaptive, suitable for changing conditions is needed. Based on the special features, RAS can be used for wind generation curtailment.
In authors' previous paper [13] , a RAS is developed to minimize the wind generation curtailment and maintain the transmission line flows at the same time. RAS in [13] is based on the DC power flow and linear programming. In this paper, we propose a new RAS with AC formulation and resiliency to limited cyber failures. Since the proposed new RAS uses AC formulation, it is more accurate than DC formulation RAS and it can also take care of the voltage limits on the load bus. In addition, due to the large communication and data requirement of RAS, communication failure may cause serious effect on the RAS operation. In order to overcome this problem, communication failure tolerance is also designed for the developed RAS. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as:
• To propose an AC load flow based RAS by considering practical constraints such as voltage limits.
• To develop a cyber physical test bed comprising of RTDS, PMUs, communication emulator and show the effects of computing node failures.
• Validate the proposed approach through real-time simulations. This paper is organized as following. Section II presents the high level architecture of the RAS. Section III introduces the mathematic formulation of the proposed RAS. Section IV presents the architecture of the testbed to validate the proposed RAS. Section V provides simulation results. Section VI concludes this paper. 
A. Data Sensors
The proposed RAS uses local and remote measurements of voltage and current phasors measured at each substation.
The temperature and wind speed are also required for the proposed RAS. The topology processing is carried out based on the breaker status. The primary source of voltage and current phasors are field sensors like Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs), Digital Fault Recorders (DFR) and Remote Terminal Units (RTU). The PMUs and DFRs transmit phasor data in a periodic fashion at the rate of 1 phasor per second. The RTUs transmit the voltage magnitude and power flow measurements at the rate of 1 set of measurements per second. The weather measurements are periodically updated every 10 minutes. The data form the PMUs and DFRs are time stamped using Global Positioning System (GPS) at the source while the measurements from the RTUs are time stamped by the data acquisition module. The physical interface for data inputs from PMUs, DFRs, RTU, and weather measurements are Ethernet ports. The protocol for input data for PMU and DFR measurements is C37.118 over TCP layer and that of RTUs and weather sensors is DNP3.
B. Data Aggregator
The measured phasor data, RTU data, and weather sensor data is sent to the data aggregator through a substation LAN. This module consists of a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC). It time aligns the data and the processed data is sent to computing nodes for determining the control actions through a WAN.
C. Substation LAN
Each substation has a local area network. Sensor data, measured at a substation is sent to the data aggregator in a substation through the substation LAN. The control commands are sent back to the windfarms through the LAN. Various sensors and actuators (relays, etc) are connected to this network.
D. Wide Area Network
Data from all the substations are communicated to the computing nodes through the wide area network. The control signals, computed is also sent to the respective substations through this network.
E. Computing Nodes
In the proposed architecture, the computing nodes receive data from all the substations. The data aggregator module time aligns all the data received. The Dynamic Line Rating (DLR) module, computes the transmission line capacities based on the weather data obtained through the weather sensors. the RAS module computes the control action (wind power curtailment, in this work) based on the line capacities estimated and the voltage and current phasors.
It is to be noted that there is a backup computing node, having all these modules. It also receives all the phasor data and the weather data simultaneously with the main node. The backup node takes the control actions, only when the main node fails or crashes. Such failures are detected by the backup node using the "Heartbeat" liveliness module. If any crash is detected, the backup node takes over and computes the control actions, thus providing the resiliency. 
F. Actuators
The actuators receive the control commands (curtailment commands) from the computing nodes through the wide area network and issue these commands to the wind farm controls through the substation LAN.
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
This section presents a brief overview of the mathematical modeling of the RAS and the solution algorithm for the optimization model of the RAS.
A. Mathematical Model
The objective of the proposed RAS is to reduce the wind energy curtailment, thereby avoiding overloads on the transmission line, while minimizing curtailment of renewable generation. This problem can be mathematically formulated as [13] ,
In this equation, the power generation for the i th wind farm is represented by P Gen i . The number of wind farms installed is represented by N. The wind farm connection status for the i th wind farm is represented by x i , i ∈ Z (1, N) . Based on the different control methods in the wind farm substation, there are two different modes for this RAS.
• Switching Mode: If wind farm substation can only turn on/off the wind farm, the wind farm connection status x i can only be zero or one. Zero means i th wind farm is shed. One means i th wind farm is connected to the grid.
• Generation Reduction Mode: If wind farm substation has the advance controller, which can accurately control the wind farm generation, the wind farm connection status x i can be any real number ranging from zero to one. The DC power flow equations can be:
The line rating on the i th transmission line is represented by LR i . P ij is the flow in the line from bus i to bus j. θ i is the angle at bus i.
By converting the above equations into a standard linear programming format, this optimization problem can be solved. The optimization problem (1) to (4) is convex, since the objective function and the constraints are convex in nature. This is by virtue of the DC formulation. Although the solution is straightforward, this formulation provides an approximate solution. The bus voltages are assumed to be 1 p.u. However, in a power grid with considerable wind power penetrations, the voltages can vary significantly as the wind power varies. The inherent variability of wind power injections becomes particularly important for wind farms connected to weaker networks, as voltage deviations become more significant and voltage regulation more challenging [14] . Hence, it is imperative to consider the voltage limits on transmission buses, while determining the optimal wind curtailment.
Considering the line flow limits and the upper limits and the lower limits on Voltage V i (1.05 and 0.95, respectively, in this study), the objective function (1) can be written as 
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linear and hence the constraint evaluation is implicit and nonconvex. Hence, a global optimization technique is required to solve the problem. This problem is modeled as a non-convex mixed integer non-linear programming problem for switching mode and a non-linear programming problem for generation reduction mode. In this work, the branch and bound algorithm [15] has been used. It is required to develop a decentralized, fast, fault tolerant RAS. The proposed RAS logic is designed to be implemented in multiple controllers at electric substations connected to data sources in a decentralized manner. This allows applications to perform calculations continually in an optimal layout for data delivery and initiating an emergency control action. It provides further reliability over the failure of a single centralized calculation node. One of the main objectives of such an architecture is to ensure reliability, in a case of any node/link failure in the distributed framework.
Depending on the distributed algorithm in development, a variety of different things can happen to the data after its made available to its local substation computer. First and foremost, data may be analyzed for importance, potentially shortening the caching period or deleting unnecessary and redundant data. This is not always possible to deduce on a local scale though, so some or all data may be forwarded onto a computational leader. The nodes selected to aggregate data from multiple (or all) other nodes are called computational leaders, they are often selected based on processing capability, but a variety of metrics can be used to varying effect, including physical grid placement, or mean network latency. These group leaders can work on data from their subsection of substations, working and share data with other leaders as necessary, to optimize the amount of stored data and work any one node is required to perform.
All data transfers along the group member, primary leader, and backup leader will pass through emulated communication network in real-time. The emulated communication network also needs to emulate the delays that occur in real world communication networks. NS-3 provides network processing delay, signal propagation delay, transmission delay, and queuing delay as a result of communication network emulation.
A set of algorithms can be used and adopted for different use cases to ensures replication of the data between multiple computational leader nodes, as well as handling their selection and coordination in failure conditions. The RAS program uses this data to monitor the system status and calculates the appropriate control action if an overload problem is forming or occurring. Control action will be sent through NS-3 simulated WAN communication network back to master PC. In the master PC, our self-designed communication program receives the control action and send it into RSCAD to control the breaker or wind farm output in the simulated power system. In a real-world implementation, these control actions would be routed directly to the appropriate windfarm.
IV. REAL TIME TEST BED TO In a simple test case, each simulated substation gets its own computation device (node), representing a real-time automation controller or substation PC. RTDS, simulating the grid network, is continually producing measurements for all buses selected at a substation. The measurements from the RTDS are obtained using GTNET PMU, which is one of the firmware supported in RTDS. The measurements from the GTNET PMUs are routed to a PDC, which in turn send the data to a communication network, emulated using ns-3 network simulator. 
A. Offline Simulation
The proposed method is validated through offline simulations on IEEE 39 bus system shown in Fig. 3 . In the test system, there are wind farms at the buses 2, 8, 12, 15, 16, 21, and 26. To simulate an overload on the transmission lines, wind generation outputs of wind farms 15 and 16 are increased to 600 MW from 300 MW. Table I shows the generations for the wind farms at the base case and the stressed case. The algorithm is implemented in MATLAB TOMLB module [16] . Table II 
B. Real Time Simulation
For the real-time simulation, DC formulation is run within the testbed's Matlab programming environment, providing real-time control actions to a test case provided by an industry partner, which is modeled and simulated in RTDS. The Modified IEEE 14 Bus system is shown in Figure 4 . It includes 3 wind farm on Bus 2, Bus 9, and Bus 11. An overload in the transmission line from bus 7 to bus 9 was created by increasing the generation of the wind farm at bus 9 from 60 MW to 100 MW.
The advantage of a dynamically calculated curtailment values is that it can be responsive in real-time to line rating changes caused by changing weather conditions. In the online test system, we use a single static set of line ratings for demonstrating a simple case of exceeding the transmission line limits. These ratings could be recalculated every cycle, derived from either weather conditions, predominantly temperature, or could be computed using inputs from power donut sensors installed at transmission lines for even more precise real-time line ratings [17] . Using the established system and line ratings, an overload condition occurs at the transmission line connected to generator 6, and curtailment action occurs. Generation is curtailed from it's previous generation value down to 81.57% of it's maximum possible generation based on the wind energy available. In larger connected systems, results may instead partially curtail multiple wind farms, but in the current test system, optimal curtailment results in only minor generation shedding, to be sufficient to protect the transmission lines. Following cases have been studied using the developed cyberphysical test bed. 1) Case A: No RAS actions. 2) Case B: All computing nodes are healthy and the communication link is intact. 3) Case C: The failure of the leader computing node. 4) Case D: The failure of networking interface Case C, which depicts a scenario in which the primary leader node fails before control action is taken shows that the flow is still maintained within the limit same as with Case B. In this case, the backup node quickly comes into the action, providing the resiliency to the node failure.
C. Case A
The voltage and current measurements are obtained from the RTDS using GTNET PMUs. The PMU data is sent to SEL PDC and PDC sends the synchrophasor data based on C37.118 protocol to NS-3 simulated communication network. Without any RAS deployed, the transmission line from Bus-6 to Bus-7 carries a real power of 111 MW, where as the capacity of the line is 95MW, resulting in an overload condition. Based on the traditional protection method, the wind farm generation, which is 180 MW, on Bus 6 will be shed in order to solve this overload problem. It can protect the transmission line from the overload condition, but it sheds a large amount of renewable energy. In order to maximize the usage of the wind power, the proposed RAS is implemented.
In this simulation case, the primary computational leader node fails. The backup leader detects this failure. For this simple case, both leaders are running in the Matlab parallel cluster, and failures are detected directly from it's interface. Upon a process death, the backup begins sending back the control signals to the power system, which in this case, is the RTDS.
In tandem with a primary leader, backups can be selected to also receive the same set of the data for processing at the same time as the leader. Results from backup leaders can be ignored unless a fault is detected in the primary leader. This is important for quick recovery in a failure condition, as the backup already has a complete set of data and a calculated result, no rollback or redelivery of data is necessitated to continue operations. In addition, when there is sufficiently low network latency, and excess time before new sensor data, backup leaders can compare their results with the primary leader, creating a sort of triple modular redundancy, only reporting the leaders result if all backups came to the same conclusion. This also protects against specific link faults, where a node may be unable to deliver its data to the primary leader, but still, can send to one or more backup leader nodes.
Thus, even in a case of node failure, the proposed scheme is capable of ensuring the resiliency, thus avoiding any catastrophic effects on the power system.
F. Case D
In this case, processes are running in standalone machines, and the communication link at the primary leader fails. Instead of utilizing parallel processing code, liveliness is detected using a heartbeat process, where a call and response occurs between the backup and primary node continually. Upon failed communication, using reasonable timeout thresholds, if the backup node believes control action should be taken, it will begin communication with the simulated system as the primary control node.
Since a process can't be certain if and where a fault has occurred, in a larger network of collaborating nodes, a Phi Accrual Failure Detector [18] is utilized to provide all nodes a suspicion level of failure for the primary and backup leader. Upon this failure likelihood value passing a defined threshold in any one node, a vote is initiated to decide on switching to the backup, and potentially to define a new backup at the same time. Table III shows the power flow in the overloaded line, for (a) without any RAS, (b) RAS with healthy primary leader node and (c) with failed primary leader node and healthy back up node, (d) with the communication at the leader node failing. It is seen from the table that without RAS, there is an overload in the line. However, with the proposed RAS, the overload in the line is alleviated and the flow is within its limits. Case C, which depicts a scenario in which the primary leader node fails, the flow is again well within the limit and is same as Case B., In this case, the backup node quickly comes into the action, providing the resiliency to the node failure. For Case D as well, the performance of the RAS action is minimally affected when a communication link fails, only adding more delay to ensure that the link failure isn't just a dropped packet.
Table III also shows the round trip time taken for the RAS action for all the four cases. Time taken for the case of link failures is slightly larger than the case where all the nodes and communication links are healthy. This is because, there is some time delay to ensure reliable detection of the cyber failures.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a fault tolerant computing is designed and implemented for cyber-resilient Remedial Action Scheme (RAS) to avoid the transmission lines overloads while minimizing the wind curtailment. The RAS is modeled as a nonlinear mixed integer optimization problem, considering the line flow and voltage constraints. The optimization problem is solved using a branch and bound method. The proposed method is validated using the New England 39 bus system and compared with the DC formulation of the RAS. Results indicate that the AC formulation leads to less amount of wind curtailment and able to maintain the voltages in the network well within the limits compared to the DC fomulation. Another contribution of this paper is to develop a cyber-physical test bed to validate the proposed cyber-resilient algorithm in real-time. This testbed is utilized to study the impacts of cyber failures on the performance of the RAS. The RAS logic and the power system network is interfaced using a communication network modeled in Network Simulator (NS-3). The proposed architecture is resilient to limited number of cyber node failures to guarantee reliable operation of RAS for line overloads and hence avoiding any possible cascading events in the network.
